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Executive Summary 
The protection of American soldiers in combat was a top priority for senior 
leaders in the U.S. Army, the DoD, and Congress. Camouflage on combat uniforms 
remained the most important contribution to the overall concealment of individual 
soldiers on the battlefield. Post-combat surveys from soldiers in Iraq and 
Afghanistan indicated that better camouflage on combat uniforms contributed to 
increased combat effectiveness. Soldiers recounted combat missions in which they 
were close enough to the enemy to hear conversations without being seen. This 
contributed to the tactical combat dominance of U.S. soldiers. Basically, the enemy 
cannot kill what they cannot see. Effective combat uniform camouflage remained a 
significant combat multiplier for soldiers—increasing mission accomplishment. 
Army soldiers in Afghanistan faced diverse battlefield operating environments 
in combat operations. During a single mission, soldiers faced different terrains 
across various environmental backgrounds. Soldiers who wore combat uniforms and 
equipment with the universal camouflage pattern (UCP), a three-color digital pattern 
adopted by the Army in 2005, did not effectively blend into the diverse backgrounds 
that were typical during combat missions. The UCP colors were not earth tone and 
were generally too bright, making soldiers easy to detect and providing ineffective 
concealment. To specifically address combat operations in Afghanistan, the Army 
selected a commercially available camouflage pattern called MultiCam© to be used 
on uniforms and equipment for deploying soldiers to Afghanistan. The Army named 
the commercially available MultiCam© pattern as the Operation Enduring Freedom 
Camouflage Pattern (OEF CP). In the meantime, the Army focused on a long-term 
camouflage strategy for soldier uniforms and equipment that would be effective 
across the diverse military operating environments and considered a family of three 
camouflage patterns—one suited for the woodland/jungle environments, one suited 
for desert/arid environments, and a transitional pattern suited for most other 
environments. 
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This combat uniform camouflage case study encourages critical analysis of 
the Army’s combat camouflage uniform project at two key decision points. The case 
focuses on the development, testing, and procurement (also referred to as 
acquisition) of combat camouflage uniforms and equipment for U.S. Army soldiers. 
The case is interesting not only to project management (PM) professionals but also 
to warfighters who appreciate the importance of effective concealment for mission 
accomplishment and safety. Key project stakeholders are passionate about 
camouflage because it saves lives in combat, and all soldiers consider themselves 
subject matter experts on uniforms and camouflage—resulting in wide applicability. 
Decisions involved with the Army camouflage uniform effort involve a complex 
acquisition environment—requiring decision-making under uncertainty with 
consideration for performance, schedule, cost/affordability, legal risk, public 
perception, and congressional oversight. The combat uniform case study reinforces 
critical thinking in uncertain environments, documents lessons learned for sound PM 
for future application, and provides wide private-sector exposure to the complexities 
of public-sector acquisition and camouflage uniform development, testing, and 
manufacture in particular.  
The case study data enables readers to become familiar with the history of 
Army combat camouflage uniforms, the basics of combat uniforms in general, and 
camouflage testing in particular. Readers of the case analyze alternative strategies 
for the Army path at two critical decision points. Both decisions involve critical 
thinking, stakeholder management, decision-making with uncertainty, and strategic 
leadership by focusing on the development of recommendations that decision-
makers can use to make the most informed decision possible.  
This case study centers on the U.S. Army’s decision to change the 
camouflage patterns on combat uniforms and equipment not only for soldiers 
stationed in war zones around the world but also for soldiers in daily garrison 
operations stateside. The case is in two distinct parts. Part I allows PM professionals 
to analyze how to recommend a path forward to senior leaders with an increased 
chance of success in meeting desired objectives. Part II allows PM professionals to 
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analyze how to recommend a set of options or courses of action for senior leaders to 
enable an informed, knowledge-based decision. 
The case study has the following learning objectives:   
• Develop the ability to critically analyze a project at key decision points by 
identifying advantages and disadvantages of various courses of action—
critical thinking. 
• Identify key stakeholders and understand their perspectives—stakeholder 
management. 
• Develop a method to compare alternative strategies or courses of action 
for the decision-maker and defend a recommendation—decision-making 
with uncertainty or ambiguity. 
• Compare alternative strategies and identify decision criteria used for the 
comparison—decision-making with uncertainty or ambiguity. 
• Identify second-order considerations or consequences of the 
recommended strategies—strategic management/leadership.  
Additionally, the case study emphasizes the following project management 
knowledge modules that are based on best practices from commercial industry and 
form the basis for the project management book of knowledge (PMBOK): 
• Project Management Principles 
• Project Phases and Processes 
• Project Resource Management 
• Project Scheduling 
• Opportunity and Risk Management 
• Business Analysis & Requirements Management 
• Project Leadership 
• Identifying and Engaging Stakeholders 
• Business and Commercial Aspects of Projects 
• Governance in Projects 
Part I (Path Forward, Development of a Strategy, Fall 2013) of the case study 
focuses on the Army program manager as he prepares for meetings in the Pentagon 
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after learning that the original Army contracting strategy has hit a roadblock. The 
following are key questions to be addressed:   
• Who are the key stakeholders in combat camouflage uniforms? 
• Who is the ultimate decision-maker? 
• How relevant was the test paradigm shift in this decision? 
• What is a realistic test and evaluation strategy and schedule leading to 
decision in terms of key program and testing events planned by quarter? 
• What options should the Army consider? 
• What criteria should the Army use to compare options and then select the 
best path forward? 
A key program management fundamental lesson learned from this part of the 
case includes not rushing to failure. Senior leaders and PMs must try to avoid the 
pitfalls of making rash decisions because the situation seems urgent. In this part of 
the case, it is probably best for the Army to take a strategic pause to let the 
Congressional language become final, and allow time to test additional patterns for 
which the government has data rights to avoid long-term affordability challenges. 
Part II (Camouflage Decision, Winter 2013/Spring 2014) of the case focuses 
again on the Army PM as he presents the testing results to Army senior leaders to 
support a path forward. The following are key questions to be addressed:    
• Was the $10 million spent over six years in the research, development, 
and testing of camouflaged uniforms a wise investment for the Army? 
• Were the options considered by the Army appropriate? Were other viable 
options not considered? 
• Was the source of funding (contingency funds or base budget funds) an 
important consideration? Why or why not? 
• What were the affordability considerations for the Army in this decision? 
• What were the important contractual and legal considerations in this 
decision? 
• How should the Army compare the options and select the best path 
forward? 
Some of the key program management fundamental lessons learned from 
this part of the case include the realization that even though performance and 
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schedule are important, sometimes the preferred path forward must be decided by 
other criteria. PMs must bring together the information for the most informed 
decision possible. In this case, the PM has to understand the affordability/cost 
implications, legal risk, and the perspectives of key stakeholders including Congress, 
soldiers, U.S. Marine Corps, and the media. 
“The rest of the story,” or what the Army actually did, can be studied not to 
provide the “right answer,” but to provide closure for readers. Many paths often lead 
to similar end results for acquisition development programs. The case study itself 
provides the epilogue to the first key decision on how the Army proceeded when the 
strategy hit the contracting barrier. For the second key decision point, the Army 
selected a pattern and named it the Operational Camouflage Pattern (OCP) to 
emphasize that the pattern’s reach extends beyond Afghanistan to other Army 
military operating environments. Because the alternative camouflage patterns all 
tested similarly, the decision came down to other considerations. The digital patterns 
that were based on the U.S. Marine Corps patterns (MARPATs) were never 
seriously considered because Army senior leaders were concerned about the 
following three things: strict literal compliance to the restrictions in the Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the backlash from the U.S. 
Marine Corps leadership (who did not favor the Army leveraging the MARPATs), and 
the soldier/public perception of the Army choosing another “digital” pattern after the 
tepid response to the UCP adoption. The OEF CP pattern was not chosen because 
of affordability concerns. The Army accepted the 10% licensing fees on all 
camouflaged uniforms and equipment for Afghanistan in OEF CP because funding 
for Afghanistan operations came from overseas contingency operations accounts 
and not from the Army’s base budget funding. Transitioning the entire Army to a 
different camouflage pattern for use in both garrison and deployments is a 
completely different effort (orders of magnitude larger in scale) than fielding uniforms 
and equipment to soldiers for one particular operation. The Army spends 
approximately $39 million per month maintaining uniforms and equipment of 
approximately one million active duty, reserve, and National Guard soldiers. Ten 
percent licensing fees of $3.9 million per month in perpetuity were obviously 
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unacceptable and unaffordable. The camouflage pattern vendor claimed that they 
did not control the 10% premium paid by the Army for OEF CP patterned uniforms 
and equipment. At the same time, they claimed they could reduce the fees to the 1% 
level. The Army could not trust the vendor—if they didn’t control the fees, how could 
they reduce them? Choosing OCP resulted in soldiers’ benefiting from an effective 
camouflage pattern and the nation benefiting from the best use of limited resources. 
The Army continues to work on improving the force protection and concealment of 
soldiers through more effective camouflage for uniforms and equipment. Specifically, 
the Army is considering camouflage tailored for woodland/jungle and desert/arid 
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Current Situation, October 2013 
Colonel Bob Smith sat in his office at Fort Belvoir in total disbelief as he read 
an email from the contracting officer stating that a contract for the Army to purchase 
the camouflage pattern had never actually been accepted by the contractor. The 
email came after Colonel Smith asked the contracting officer to send a copy of the 
signed contract. The contracting officer’s response was delayed by several weeks 
because Department of Defense (DoD) agencies were resuming normal operations 
after being shut down October 1–16, 2013, with most federal employees furloughed, 
because neither an appropriation act nor a continuing resolution had been enacted 
for FY 2014. On the Friday afternoon before the shutdown, the contracting office 
reported the successful award of a contract to Crye Precision LLC for their 
camouflage pattern, commercially known as MultiCam©. Because of significant 
Army senior leader and congressional interest, notification of the contract awarded 
was documented in significant activities reports to the chief of staff of the Army 
(CSA) and secretary of the Army (SecArmy) levels.  
Now, Colonel Smith thought about how to notify the Army senior leaders that 
the contract had not been awarded and that his team would have to develop options 
for the Army to consider going forward—both of these tasks were significant events 
considering the importance of the Army combat uniform camouflage decision. The 
Army had completed the extensive combat uniform camouflage testing—testing that 
began in 2009 with reviews and a decision process that finally resulted in the 
selection of an acceptable camouflage pattern for Army combat uniforms. Colonel 
Smith started to consider all the information needed to help Army senior leaders 
make an informed decision: the importance of camouflage to soldier force protection 
and mission effectiveness, camouflage testing basics, the history of the testing 
program, the status of soldier combat uniforms, and the affordability aspects of the 
decision. First things first—Colonel Smith asked his deputy to immediately draft a 
notice to inform senior leaders that the previously announced award of the contract 
was premature.   
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Background 
It’s Only Camouflage—How Important Can It Be on the Modern 
Battlefield? 
The protection of American soldiers in combat was a top priority for senior 
leaders in the U.S. Army, DoD, and Congress. The DoD had committed 
considerable resources and funding over the years in research and development, 
resulting in advanced materials and manufacturing processes. These investments 
increased the combat effectiveness of the soldiers and their units. The force 
protection of soldiers was considered as a layered approach. The outer force 
protection layer for soldiers was situational awareness. The inner force protection 
layer was personal protective equipment, like helmets and ballistic vests with 
ceramic plate inserts. The middle force protection layer was concealment. 
Camouflage on combat uniforms remained the most important contribution to the 
overall concealment of individual soldiers on the battlefield. Reinforcing the 
importance of camouflage was the result of post-combat surveys from soldiers from 
duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which the majority of soldiers indicated that better 
camouflage on combat uniforms contributed to increased combat effectiveness. 
Anecdotal evidence from soldiers on the importance of camouflage came from 
recounted combat missions in which they were close enough to the enemy to hear 
conversations without being seen—particularly during night operations. This 
contributed to the dominance of U.S. soldiers and the “we own the night” tactical 
advantage of U.S. forces. Basically, the enemy cannot kill what they cannot see. 
Effective combat uniform camouflage remained a significant combat multiplier for 
soldiers—increasing mission accomplishment. 
Army soldiers in Afghanistan faced diverse battlefield operating environments 
in combat operations (see Figure 1). During a single mission, soldiers faced many 
different terrains across various environmental backgrounds. Each of these 
environmental backgrounds contained different earth-tone colors, which required 
different matching earth-tone colors in the combat uniform for it to effectively conceal 
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a soldier from detection and/or observation. Soldiers who wore combat uniforms and 
equipment with the universal camouflage pattern (UCP), a three-color digital pattern 
adopted by the Army in 2005, did not effectively blend into the diverse backgrounds 
that were typical during combat missions. The UCP colors were not earth tone and 
were generally too bright—making soldiers easy to detect and providing ineffective 
concealment. 
 
Figure 1: Why the Army Needed a Different Camouflage Pattern 
The Army faced a critical question with respect to providing soldiers with 
effective camouflage on combat uniforms and equipment—how many camouflage 
patterns should be adopted? Soldiers operating in diverse operating environments 
have proven that the most effective camouflage pattern matches the colors of the 
background environment. A “chameleon” camouflage pattern eluded the Army due 
to low technological maturity level—basically it was just not feasible to have a 
combat uniform with chameleon camouflage that would change color on its own to fit 
into its environment. Logistical and affordability considerations limited the Army from 
adopting a specific camouflage pattern for every combat environment. The Army 
settled on a strategy considering three camouflage patterns—one suited for the 
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woodland/jungle environments, one suited for desert/arid environments, and a 
transitional pattern suited for most other environments. In support of the combat 
uniform camouflage effort, the Army initiated an assessment of terrain throughout 
the globe. The Army Corps of Engineers classified the Army military operating 
environments across the combatant commands as 44% transitional, 37% 
woodland/jungle, and 19% desert/arid environments. A woodland camouflage 
pattern would be very effective against backgrounds of darker brown and green 
colors and ineffective in dry arid regions (see Figure 2). On the other hand, a desert 
camouflage pattern would be very effective against backgrounds of lighter tan/sand 
colors and ineffective in woodland/jungle terrains. Finally, a transitional camouflage 
pattern would provide reasonable concealment against a broad range of 
environmental backgrounds. Seasonal considerations break down the 
woodland/jungle and transitional backgrounds even further to dormant (without 
leaves on trees) and verdant (with leaves on trees) classifications. 
 
Figure 2: Effectiveness of Camouflage Patterns in Different Environments 
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Camouflage Testing Basics 
The Army recognized that advancing the science of combat uniform 
camouflage testing was vitally important to enabling knowledge-based decisions on 
the most effective camouflage pattern. It was acknowledged that it was unaffordable 
to field-test various camouflage patterns in every possible environment and 
background. To gain a statistically robust data set to support decision-making, the 
Army developed a test and evaluation strategy that involved a paradigm shift (see 
Figure 3). The strategy leveraged four mutually supporting lines of effort. Technical 
development testing consisted of photo simulation for pattern selection and spectral 
reflectance measurements for performance insights. Operational field-testing with 
soldiers consisted of static observation tests for pattern performance confirmation 
and maneuver tests for both pattern performance confirmation and operational 
insights.  
 
Figure 3: Camouflage Test and Evaluation Strategy 
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Normally, operationally realistic field-testing carried the most weight in 
decision-making over less operationally realistic developmental testing, which might 
rely on modeling and simulation. For camouflage testing, however, a much more 
extensive data set could be obtained if computer-based testing techniques were 
used in which soldiers observed photos of soldiers in camouflaged uniforms in many 
different backgrounds representing the Army’s diverse military operating 
environments. The main effort for the test and evaluation strategy centered on the 
use of photo simulation to compare the effectiveness of camouflage patterns.  
Two different criteria existed to compare the effectiveness of camouflage: 
detection and blending. Camouflage testing determined detection and blending 
scores for various camouflage patterns in relevant military operating environments. 
Detection is the ability to pick out the camouflage pattern measured at different 
distances, and blending is how well the camouflage pattern matches the background 
once detected at a specific range. Photo simulation evaluations allowed for 
collection of significant data in many backgrounds and controlled variables (such as 
distance, movement, background, and brightness) so the difference in detection and 
blending scores could be attributable to different camouflage patterns. The word 
simulation referred to the fact that the technique simulated soldiers being outside at 
the various sites by looking at computer screens of photos of soldiers in camouflage 
uniforms. Camouflage pattern selection criteria was based on both detection scores 
(at ranges to 450 meters during the day and to 250 meters at night) and blending 
scores (at 50 meters during the day and at 25 meters during the night). (Refer to 
Appendix 1 for a more detailed explanation of combat uniform testing basics.) 
A Basic Overview of Army Combat Camouflage Uniforms 
After basic initial entry training, the Army issued to soldiers uniforms and 
other essential combat equipment, classified as organization clothing and individual 
equipment (OCIE) and generally referred to as the soldier’s clothing bag. Part of this 
issue to soldiers was the army combat uniform (ACU). The ACU was the uniform 
that soldiers wore in daily garrison operations when not deployed to combat 
operations. The ACU fabric was a 50-50 mix of cotton and nylon, and came with the 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 8 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
universal camouflage pattern (UCP), selling in the Military Clothing Store for about 
$90 for a coat and trouser set. After they wore out, soldiers used their clothing 
replacement allowance to buy new sets of uniforms. Examples of OCIE included the 
seven-layer Generation III Extended Cold Weather Clothing System (ECWCS), the 
field pack or rucksack (part of the modular lightweight load-carrying equipment 
[MOLLE]), and the ballistic vests (part of the improved outer tactical vests [IOTV])—
all issued with the UCP. 
Beginning in mid-2005, the Army recognized the importance of protecting 
soldiers from battlefield hazards and included specific uniform requirements for 
protection against insects (resulting in permethrin treatment) and fire or flame 
(resulting in flame-resistant fabrics). 
When soldiers deployed to combat, the Army issued soldiers the Flame 
Resistant Army Combat Uniform (FRACU) with the UCP. The FRACU was made of 
65% rayon, 25% para-aramid, and 10% nylon. The price of a FRACU set of coat and 
trousers averaged about $180. Additionally, soldiers received the Flame Resistant 
Environment Ensemble (FREE)—the FR version of the ECWCS. Soldiers did not 
normally deploy with the clothing bag–issued ACU and ECWCS—those were for 
daily wear in garrison operations and in training. In 2011, the Army issued to soldiers 
deploying to Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) the FRACUs and 
OCIE with the OEF Camouflage Pattern (OEF CP).  
Figure 4 displays a pictorial representation of the uniforms soldiers would 
typically have worn in the summer of 2013 around the world. Soldiers wore the ACU 
with UCP in most regions of the world, except in the Middle East. Soldiers wore the 
FRACU with UCP when deployed from combat operations in Iraq and Kuwait, while 
soldiers supporting combat operations in OEF wore the FRACU in OEF CP. 
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Figure 4: Common Operation Picture for Army Combat Uniforms  
The Army remained very cognizant of the value of the combat uniforms and 
OCIE worn by soldiers and in the inventory. For example, based on the number of 
active, reserve, and National Guard soldiers both non-deployed and deployed, the 
ACUs worn by soldiers in their clothing bag valued about $131 million and turned 
over every year. The value of OCIE worn by soldiers or in inventory with UCP totaled 
about $3.5 billion and turned over every five to 10 years depending on the durability 
of the items. Deploying soldiers to Iraq and Kuwait had another $170 million worth of 
UCP uniforms and OCIE. Uniforms and OCIE with the UCP totaled over $3.8 billion 
in value (see Figure 5). To support soldiers deploying to Afghanistan, the Army 
maintained uniforms and OCIE with the OEC CP with a value of about $1.4 billion. 
Based on the average monthly demand, the Army spent approximately $39 million 
per month sustaining UCP uniforms and OCIE from the Army base operations and 
maintenance budget for an Army of approximately one million soldiers (active, 
guard, and reserve components). 
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Figure 5: The Value of Camouflaged Army Combat Uniforms and Equipment 
Army Combat Uniform Evolution 
Figure 6 presents a brief recent history of Army combat uniforms since the 
adoption of the Army Combat Uniform (ACU) with the Universal Camouflage Pattern 
(UCP). In 2005, the Army adopted the ACU to replace the Battle Dress Uniform 
(BDU) with the woodland camouflage pattern and Desert Camouflage Uniform 
(DCU) with the desert camouflage pattern. The ACU was produced with the UCP—a 
three-color (urban gray, desert sand, and foliage green) digital pattern. The Army 
wanted a single combat uniform design with a single camouflage pattern. Field 
camouflage tests at Fort Lewis, WA; National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA; and 
Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA, confirmed the following: 
• In woodland environments, the ACU was equally effective as the BDU. 
• In a desert environment, the ACU was close to as effective as the DCU.  
• In an urban environment, the ACU was equally effective as the BDU or 
DCU.  
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Additionally, in camouflage blending tests (day and night) using photo 
simulation techniques, UCP provided the best average performance across desert, 
woodland, and urban environments compared to 10 other patterns. These patterns 
were Marine Pattern (MARPAT) Desert, MARPAT Woodland, Scorpion (a pattern 
developed by Crye Precision LLC under a contract with the Army), Desert Brush, 
Desert Track, Desert/Urban Track, Standard Desert (DCU), Woodland Track, 
Standard Woodland (BDU), and Woodland Brush. The Army’s decision to adopt a 
digital pattern (UCP) was influenced by the success of the U.S. Marine Corps digital 
patterns—MARPAT Woodland and MARPAT Desert. Ultimately, in testing, UCP 
provided better or equal concealment than other patterns in urban and desert 
terrains—obviously very important to the Army embroiled in combat operations in 
Iraq.  
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Figure 6: Army Camouflage Uniform Timeline 
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From after the adoption of the ACU in 2005 until 2009, the Army received 
overwhelmingly negative feedback from soldiers in combat operations in Afghanistan 
about the suitability of the FRACUs in UCP for the diverse Afghan backgrounds, 
terrains, and environments (see Figure 1). As a result, in the FY 2009 Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, Congress directed the Army to take immediate action to provide 
effective camouflage for personnel deployed to Afghanistan. In September 2009, the 
Army submitted a report to Congress on combat uniform camouflage that outlined a 
four-phased approach: Phase I Immediate Action, Phase II Build the Science, Phase 
III OEF Specific Camouflage, and Phase IV Army Combat Uniform Decision for a 
Long Term Multi-Environment Camouflage. 
In November 2009, the Army completed Phase I by fielding two Army 
battalions (approximately 2,000 soldiers) with uniforms and OCIE in two different 
patterns. One camouflage pattern was Universal Camouflage Pattern-D (UCP-D)—a 
variant of UCP with coyote brown color added and less sand color—and the other 
pattern was commercial camouflage called MultiCam© produced by Crye Precision 
LLC. MultiCam©—a seven-color pattern that was in use at the time with U.S. Special 
Forces in Afghanistan—was a variation of the original Scorpion pattern considered 
by the Army earlier in the UCP decision. 
From November 2009 to January 2010, the Army conducted Phase II, which 
involved soldier feedback of the two fielded patterns (MultiCam© and UCP-D) as 
well as photo simulation (pattern-in-picture) evaluations by soldiers of six 
camouflage patterns (UCP, MultiCam©, UCP-D, Mirage, Desert Brush, and a Navy 
pattern referred to as AOR2), inserted into photographs of eight different OEF sites. 
Soldiers overwhelmingly preferred both MultiCam© and UCP-D with an edge in 
preference toward MultiCam©. The photo simulation involved assessments of both 
the detectability (range at which pattern was detected) and blending performance 
(qualitative measure of how well the pattern blends into background). MultiCam© 
was harder to detect and blended slightly better than the other five camouflage 
patterns. 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 14 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
In February 2010, initiating Phase III, the Army selected MultiCam© as the 
pattern to be used on the Fire Resistant ACU (FRACU) and Organization Clothing 
and Individual Equipment (OCIE) for deploying soldiers to Afghanistan. The Army 
named the commercially available MultiCam© pattern as the OEF Camouflage 
Pattern (OEF CP). Because schedule and speed of delivery was critical, the Army 
encouraged Crye to enter separate licensing agreements with the companies that 
printed the OEF CP on FRACUs and OCIE. In July 2010, the Army began fielding 
uniforms and OCIE in the OEF CP to deploying OEF soldiers. The Army was not 
privy to the specifics of the licensing agreements. However, the Army ended up 
paying about a 10% premium on every uniform or piece of camouflaged equipment 
that was camouflaged with OEF CP compared to uniforms and equipment with UCP. 
At the time, schedule and getting updated camouflaged uniforms and equipment to 
field as quickly as possible trumped affordability concerns—especially considering 
that uniforms for combat operations in Afghanistan were funded by overseas 
contingencies operations (OCO) accounts without the restrictions placed upon 
spending that is part of the Army’s base budget.  
In December 2010, the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) outlined an 
18-month-long competitive effort to lead a camouflage integrated product team (IPT) 
through the Phase IV effort for the Army’s selection of the long-term combat uniform 
and OCIE camouflage strategy to be effective in desert/arid, transitional, and 
woodland/jungle environments. The goal was to present the results to Army 
leadership in the fall of 2012 for a decision. 
From January 2011 to June 2011, the Army scoped the Phase IV camouflage 
effort. Based on work performed by the Natick Soldier Research Development & 
Engineering Center (NSRDEC) completed in 2009, the Army knew that 
environmentally specific camouflage patterns outperformed (meaning provided more 
effective concealment) a single “universal” pattern. The objective of Phase IV was to 
develop a “family” of three uniform camouflage patterns with a single coordinated 
pattern for OCIE to provide effective concealment across the globe in 
woodland/jungle, transitional, and desert/arid environments. A total of 22 family 
submissions from industry and the government competed in the first stage of Phase 
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IV—18 family submissions were found to be technically acceptable. These families 
of patterns participated in “pattern in picture” blending photo simulation evaluation. 
The patterns were judged based on the best legacy patterns in the Defense 
Department inventory (desert vs. a Navy pattern called AOR1, transitional vs. OEF 
CP, and woodland vs. a Navy pattern called AOR2) with family scores equally 
weighting the woodland, transitional, and desert environments. Five families of 
patterns (four commercial vendors and one NSRDEC submission) performed as well 
as or better than the legacy family of patterns. The four down-selected vendors 
included Crye Precision LLC, Kryptek Inc., Atlantic Diving Supply (ADS) Inc., and 
Brookwood Companies Inc. It is noteworthy that three patterns were visually similar 
in appearance: OEF CP (a baseline pattern), the transitional pattern proposed by 
Crye, and the transitional pattern submitted by NSRDEC named ScorpionW2. Each 
of these patterns was developed, changed, and optimized independently from the 
same base pattern called Scorpion—a pattern developed by Crye in the early 2000s 
under contract with the U.S. Army (see Appendix 2 for a description of the 
relationships and differences between the Scorpion, MultiCam© [OEF CP], Phase IV 
Crye transitional, and ScorpionW2 camouflage patterns). All three patterns 
performed similarly in testing, which served as a built-in, internal verification of the 
validity of the testing. At the time, even though the NSRDEC family performed well in 
source selection pattern-in-picture photo simulation testing, the Army decided not to 
continue to allow the NSRDEC family of patterns to participate in Stage II Phase IV 
testing because the family of patterns was not of consistent matching geometric 
shapes—one of the criteria established by the Army and required in the contracts 
with the four commercial vendors. 
In January 2012, Phase IV contracts were awarded to the four down-selected 
vendors to produce fabric for test articles (both uniforms and OCIE) for the second 
stage of Phase IV, which would include field testing, extensive photo simulation 
evaluations, and lab testing. The contracts with each of the four vendors were firm 
fixed price (FFP) contracts, with periods of performance not to exceed 30 months to 
supply the Army with 1,000 yards of fabric to be used by the Army to fabricate 
testing uniforms and OCIE under separate “cut & sew” contracts. The contracts 
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included FFP options for the government to procure the nonexclusive license rights 
for each of the proposed camouflage patterns. The competitive range to buy the 
license rights from the four vendors for a single camouflage pattern ranged from 
$25,000 to $2.1 million. Crye offered the set of patterns for $600,000 ($200,000 
each for three patterns—woodland, desert, and transitional/OCIE), ADS offered the 
set for $533,000 ($133,000 each for four patterns—woodland, desert, transitional, 
and OCIE), Brookwood offered the set for $100,000 ($25,000 each for four 
patterns—woodland, desert, transitional, and OCIE), and Kryptek offered the set for 
$6.3 million ($2.1 million each for three patterns—woodland, desert, and 
transitional/OCIE). Each of the four vendors signed a nonexclusive license 
agreement that provided the Army the option to obtain (for a single lump sum) the 
rights to use the material for the production of patterns for printing on an unlimited 
number of uniforms, individual equipment, and unit-level equipment for U.S. 
government purposes (e.g., Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard, 
including their active and reserve components) excepting foreign military sales with 
successive renewable 10-year periods.  
From July 2012 to March 2013, the Army conducted the most extensive 
uniform camouflage testing ever undertaken. The 12 commercial vendors’ patterns 
(each of the four vendors had a woodland, transitional, and desert pattern along with 
a matching transitional OCIE pattern) and six reference patterns (UCP, OEF CP, 
MARPAT-W, MARPAT-D, AOR1, and AOR2) were printed on fabric, and the fabric 
was assembled into uniforms and OCIE (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Phase IV Camouflage Patterns Tested (note that W refers to woodland, T refers to 
transitional, and A refers to arid)  
The photo simulation evaluations collected 91,486 data points in detection 
and blending tests (both day and night) using 39 different backgrounds from seven 
global locations. Field tests for static observations detections were conducted at 
three different locations, resulting in the collection of an additional 25,415 data 
points. Operational field tests with force-on-force soldiers were conducted at two 
locations, gathering another 973 data points. Finally, the spectral reflectance 
measurements were conducted by the U.S. Army Night Vision Lab to assess pattern 
“brightness” in visual, near infrared (NIR), and shortwave infrared (SWIR) bands. 
The results of this extensive testing showed that all the vendor patterns in 
their intended backgrounds performed better than UCP—confirming the Army’s 
intent to replace UCP. All the vendors’ patterns performed similarly in their intended 
backgrounds—this “tight shot” group gave the Army many options and confirmed 
that overall pattern colors and brightness were much more important than pattern 
design when assessing concealment effectiveness. There was slight improvement in 
effectiveness of a family of patterns in their intended backgrounds over the 
performance of a single transitional pattern across the three background classes; 
however, the operational relevance of this improved performance could not be 
quantified. 
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In May 2013, Army senior leaders approved the expanded use of OEF CP to 
replace UCP across the Army and the purchase of the nonexclusive government 
license rights to one of the competing vendors’ patterns (the Crye transitional pattern 
that was very similar and visually indistinguishable from OEF CP) offered as an 
option in the Phase IV contract. Because all of the vendor patterns performed 
similarly in testing, the decision was based on other considerations, primarily 
affordability—the Army could leverage existing inventories of OEF CP OCIE and 
reduce the overall implementation costs to the Army.  
However, the announcement of the decision and implementation was 
delayed. Army senior leaders were hesitant to announce a uniform change decision 
during a time of intense budget pressure and with the threat of sequestration 
looming. More importantly, the draft FY 2014 NDAA was released, and it potentially 
limited the Army’s camouflage flexibility by prohibiting any new camouflage patterns 
unless all services adopted the new pattern. At the time, it was unclear whether the 
camouflage patterns tested in the Phase IV effort would potentially violate the NDAA 
restrictions. 
In August 2013, to avoid the threat of protests by Phase IV vendors and 
subsequent lengthy contractual challenges and to avoid potential violations of the 
new statutory restrictions in the pending NDAA, the Army changed its contracting 
strategy to pursue a sole-source contract for the non-exclusive license rights (i.e., 
government purpose rights) to OEF CP and to delay exercising any remaining 
Phase IV contract options until the FY14 NDAA language was final. The vendor, 
Crye Precision LLC, indicated to the Army that the price for OEF CP would be 
similar to the price offered to the Army for the transitional pattern non-exclusive 
license rights in the Phase IV contract. 
In October 2013, Crye Precision LLC balked at the terms of the contract 
proposed by the Army for OEF CP. The contract terms for the non-exclusive license 
rights were identical to the Phase IV contract option terms. Crye Precision LLC now 
wanted considerably more money for OEF CP than they offered for their transitional 
pattern.  
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Part I: Path Forward, Development of a Strategy, 
Fall 2013 
All this information swirled around in Colonel Smith’s head as he prepared to 
meet in the Pentagon with Army senior leaders. Fortunately, for Colonel Smith, the 
CSA’s office wanted the following specifically addressed in the meeting scheduled 
for December 2013: 
• How did this happen? How was a contract reported as signed that was not 
actually signed? What was the impact of the pending NDAA restrictions, 
and how would the Army keep Congress informed? What was the impact 
on the Phase IV contracts? 
• What was the schedule and a path toward an Army decision? What were 
the camouflage options, as well as key program and testing events 
considering the performance, cost, and schedule implications? 
• What were the risks associated with this camouflage decision? 
Based on the guidance from leadership, Colonel Smith and his team put 
together some options for the Army to consider:  
• Option 1: Continue to negotiate with Crye for the nonexclusive rights for 
OEF CP. The initial price quoted started at $65 million but was later 
reduced to a lump sum of $24 million or 1% royalty on the price of each 
camouflaged uniform or piece of equipment. 
• Option 2: Exercise the Phase IV contract option for nonexclusive rights to 
the Crye transitional pattern. 
• Option 3: Renegotiate all the Phase IV contract options for the 
nonexclusive rights for the patterns with all four vendors and try to select a 
pattern after the renegotiations.  
• Option 4: Take a strategic pause and consider existing government 
patterns and patterns for which the government has license rights—for 
example, the NSRDEC pattern ScorpionW2. 
Colonel Smith asked his team if there were any other options and what the 
decision criteria would be to compare these courses of action. Performance of the 
patterns remained the Army’s most important criteria. However, cost/affordability 
was important, as well as schedule, congressional considerations (adherence to 
law), and litigation considerations such as the chance of protests and lawsuits 
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challenging intellectual property rights to potential patent, copyright, and trademark 
issues.  
Colonel Smith realized this would not be an easy set of meetings at the 
Pentagon. Despite the importance of combat uniform camouflage, efforts to change 
camouflage face the challenges that all programs within the DoD face: a complex, 
bureaucratic defense acquisition institution (refer to Appendix 3 for a description of 
the defense acquisition institution). Any decision to change Army camouflage 
crosses multiple chains of command with different decision-makers because it 
affects both uniforms and equipment. Uniform changes are approved by the CSA—
and sometimes the SecArmy, if there is intense congressional, public, or media 
interest—after an approval recommendation from the Army Uniform Board. But 
camouflage also goes on organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE), 
and each piece of soldier kit (cold weather clothing, rucksacks, weapons, bags for 
night vision sights, etc.) may have a different program decision-maker—either a 
program executive officer or the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), depending on 
the acquisition category. 
Colonel Smith labored over how to pull together this information into a 
decision and what recommendation he would make when invariably asked by Army 
senior leaders. What should the Army decide? 
Exhibit 1. Part I Case Study Discussion Questions 
• Who are the key stakeholders in combat camouflage uniforms? 
• Who is the ultimate decision-maker? 
• How relevant was the test paradigm shift in this decision? 
• What is a realistic test and evaluation strategy and schedule leading to 
decision in terms of key program and testing events planned by quarter? 
• What options should the Army consider? 
• What criteria should the Army use to compare options and then select the 
best path forward?  
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Part II: Camouflage Decision, Winter 2013/Spring 
2014 
Following a series of meetings in the Pentagon with Army senior leaders, the 
CSA issued the following guidance: delay any immediate decision, ensure all options 
for the Army moving forward were rigorously tested, ensure the options considered 
met the intent of the NDAA by pulsing the congressional professional staff members, 
and provide an update to the SecArmy. The SecArmy subsequently approved the 
testing of transitional pattern alternatives for March 2014 with an anticipated decision 
pending successful and positive testing results in April 2014 (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Approved Revised Army Plan 
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After being reprimanded for lack of proper program oversight and damaging 
the reputation of Army acquisition leaders in the Pentagon, Colonel Smith led his 
team to execute yet another revised strategy for combat uniform camouflage testing. 
In December 2013, the FY14 NDAA became final and officially prohibited the 
services from adopting new camouflage patterns unless all the services adopted the 
new pattern. This new law restricted the number of camouflage patterns considered 
going forward. The intent of the new strategy was to consider alternatives to OEF 
CP that provided equivalent or better performance, were affordable/fiscally 
responsible to implement, and were in compliance with the FY14 NDAA. The testing 
included three baseline reference patterns (UCP, MARPAT Woodland, and 
MARPAT Desert), OEF CP, and viable OEF CP alternatives. These alternatives 
were the ScorpionW2 pattern and two digital transitional camouflage patterns 
(referred to as DTC1 and DTC2—patterns based on MARPAT but with four earth-
tone based colors; see Figure 9). The Army had a series of meetings with 
congressional members who sponsored the NDAA legislation and professional staff 
members who wrote the actual language to ensure the patterns considered were 
within the intent of the law. Congressional leaders considered the DTC1 and DTC2 
patterns in a “gray area” of the new restrictions and were noncommittal about 
whether these patterns met the intent of the law. Nevertheless, the Army decided to 
test these patterns along with the other patterns. 
 
Figure 9: Patterns Tested by the Army at Fort Benning in April 2014 
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In April 2014, the Army tested alternative transitional patterns at Fort Benning 
in operational field tests with U.S. Army Sniper School Cadre and in photo simulation 
assessments using soldiers from the 75th Ranger Regiment (see Figures 10 and 
11). The testing to support an Army decision was rigorous and met the intent of the 
Army CSA. The testing involved used sniper experts to assess the operational 
relevance of the patterns in operational field tests and 106 soldiers as observers of 
the patterns in 46 separate backgrounds in photo simulation evaluations—collecting 
19,474 data points. 
 
Figure 10: Operational Field Test Results 
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Figure 11: Photo Simulation Test Results 
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From the results shown in Figures 10 and 11, the Army came to the following 
conclusions: UCP performed poorly in all backgrounds (confirming prior results); 
OEF CP, ScorpionW2, DTC1, and DTC2 scored similarly across all background 
types; USMC MARPAT Woodland performed well in woodland dormant 
backgrounds; and USMC MARPAT Desert performed well in arid environments. The 
results confirmed that there was a “tight shot” group for the effectiveness and 
performance of the transitional patterns. The Army decision would probably come 
down to other considerations like affordability, cost, implementation and execution 
ease, schedule, contracting challenges, and intellectual property rights concerns 
(potential patent, trademark, and copyright challenges).  
Again, Colonel Smith assembled his team to consider the following options for 
CSA and SecArmy to consider: 
• Option 1: Do nothing. Make no decision at this time and continue the 
current situation of issuing to soldiers UCP uniforms and equipment for all 
missions, except in Afghanistan where they would continue to get OEF CP 
uniforms and equipment. 
• Option 2: Select OEF CP, accept the vendor’s terms, and expand its use 
beyond Afghanistan to being the standard pattern of all Army uniforms and 
equipment. 
• Option 3: Select ScorpionW2 and replace UCP uniforms and equipment 
over time as they wore out. 
• Option 4: Select a digital transitional camouflage (DTC1) and replace UCP 
uniforms and equipment over time when they wore out. 
Colonel Smith and his team considered these options the main courses of action for 
Army senior leaders to consider. The team debated the following decision criteria to 
apply to these options: performance, schedule, affordability/cost, legal risk, and the 
perspectives of key stakeholders such as soldiers, Congress, the Marine Corps, and 
the media. 
Colonel Smith prepared for another challenging sets of meetings and did not 
like the thought of going back into the lion’s den again with Army senior leaders in 
the Pentagon. This would be the third time he attempted to get a decision on 
camouflage for Army uniforms and equipment. However, he knew that the decision 
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was of utmost importance for soldiers in combat. Effective camouflage increased 
soldier combat effectiveness and improved force protection—saving soldiers’ lives in 
battle. Colonel Smith thought about the decision in terms of return of investment 
(ROI). From 2009 to 2014 (over six years), the Army spent less than $10 million in 
the research, development, and testing of camouflage patterns, but a camouflage 
change would affect the purchase of $5.2 billion of uniforms and equipment over the 
next five to 10 years. Colonel Smith considered the research, development, and 
testing of camouflage patterns a wise investment for soldiers and for the American 
taxpayer. 
What should the Army do? 
Exhibit 2. Part II Case Study Discussion Questions 
• Was the $10 million spent over six years in the research, development, 
and testing of camouflaged uniforms a wise investment for the Army? 
• Were the options considered by the Army appropriate? Were other viable 
options not considered? 
• Was the source of funding (contingency funds or base budget funds) an 
important consideration? Why or why not? 
• What were the affordability considerations for the Army in this decision? 
• What were the important contractual and legal considerations in this 
decision? 
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Appendix 1. Camouflage Testing Basics 
Pattern testing and selection criteria was based on both detection (ability to 
detect the pattern at ranges out to 450 meters day and 250 meters night) and 
blending (ability to match the background environment at 50 meters day and 25 
meters night). Detection is the ability pick up the camouflage pattern measured at 
different distances, and blending is how well the camouflage pattern matches the 
background once detected at a specific close range (see Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12: Camouflage Pattern Testing Criteria  
Camouflage pattern testing used a combination of field trials and photo 
simulation evaluations. The field trials included day and night testing, squad-on-
squad battle drill lanes, movement to contact drills, and individual soldier 
detection/acquisition at varying distances and varying soldier positions (prone, 
kneeling, and standing). The soldier photo simulation evaluations included feedback 
from soldiers who assessed the camouflage’s detection and blending ability using 
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calibrated images of uniformed individuals in arid, woodland, and transitional 
backgrounds. Photo simulation evaluations allow for collection of significant data in 
many backgrounds. These evaluations also control variables (such as distance, 
movement, background, and brightness) so that change in detection and blending 
scores are only attributable to different camouflage patterns. The word simulation in 
this case just means that we were simulating soldiers being outside at the various 
sites by taking images of soldiers and challenging other soldiers to detect them (see 
Figure 13). Soldiers scored images of real camouflaged personnel in real outdoor 
scenes (day and night) on a computer monitor. Detection scores came in the form of 
R50 values, which is the range at which 50% of the observers detect the target 
(lower numbers are better, meaning shorter detection ranges—in other words, the 
closer the detection, the better the concealment). 
 
Figure 13: Example Photo Simulation Test and Test Output and the Probability of Detection 
(Pd) versus Detection Range 
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An overall summary of the Phase IV photo simulation testing confirmed the 
following: 
• All vendor families of patterns and transitional patterns alone performed 
significantly better than UCP. On the average, families blended better than 
UCP (217% better day and 9% better night), and transitional patterns blended 
better than UCP (190% better day and 4% better night). On average, families 
of patterns were harder to detect than UCP (16% better day and night), and 
transitional patterns alone were harder to detect than UCP (10% better day 
and 21% better night). 
• Overall, the vendor families of patterns and their transitional patterns 
performed similarly with no operational relevance for the differences in 
scoring among the vendor families or among the transitional patterns. The 
competing vendor families obtained blending scores within 11% day and 
within 7% night of each other. On average, there were no significant 
differences between vendor families or between vendor transitional patterns 
for detection. 
• Families of patterns performed slightly better than their complementary 
transitional patterns alone, but the operational relevance for the improvement 
could not be determined. For example, on average, families blended better 
than transitional patterns (9% better day and 5% better night); however, there 
were no significant differences between families and transitional patterns for 
detection scores. The limited detection scoring differences between the 
families and transitional patterns is explained by the fact that the detection 
testing was performed at longer ranges where uniform brightness and 
contrasts between the uniform and OCIE is more critical to soldier 
concealment than patterns (colors and shapes) alone. 
• The USMC and Navy patterns performed similarly to the vendor patterns in 
their intended environments. No transitional USMC or Navy pattern exists for 
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Appendix 2. Scorpion Camouflage Pattern Background 
 
Figure 14: Timeline of Scorpion Pattern Derivatives 
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Appendix 3. U.S. Defense Acquisition Institution—
Decision Framework 
Within the DoD, the development, testing, procurement, and fielding of 
capability for the warfighter operates within a decision-making framework that is 
complex. Within the private sector, similar frameworks exist. The U.S. defense 
acquisition institution has three fundamental support templates that provide 
requirements, funding, and management constraints. The executive branch, 
Congress, and industry work together to deliver capability with the program manager 
(PM) as the central person responsible for cost, schedule, and performance. Figure 
15 depicts this framework. 
 
Figure 15: Defense Acquisition Institution 
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The government PM is at the center of defense acquisition, which aims to 
deliver warfighter capability. The PM is responsible for cost, schedule, and 
performance (commonly referred to as the “triple constraint”) of assigned projects—
usually combat systems within the DoD. The executive branch of government 
provides the PM a formal chain of command in the DoD. The PM typically reports 
directly to a program executive officer, who reports to the service acquisition 
executive (an assistant secretary for that service—either Army, Navy, or Air Force), 
who reports to the defense acquisition executive (the under secretary of defense for 
acquisition, technology, and logistics). Depending on the program’s visibility, 
importance, and/or funding levels, the program decision authority is assigned to the 
appropriate level of the chain of command.  
Programs within defense acquisition require resources (for funding) and 
contracts (for execution of work) with industry. Congress provides the resources for 
the defense programs through the annual enactment of the defense authorization 
and appropriation acts, which become law and statutory requirements. The PM, 
through warranted contracting officers governed by the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation, enters contracts with private companies within the defense industry. 
Other important stakeholders include actual warfighters, the American public, the 
media, and functional experts (like engineers, testers, logisticians, cost estimators, 
etc.), as well as fiscal and regulatory lawyers.  
As a backdrop to this complicated organizational structure for defense PMs, 
there are three decision support templates: one for the generation of requirements, a 
second for the management of program milestones, and a third for the allocation of 
resources. Each of these decision support systems is fundamentally driven by 
different and often contradictory factors. The requirement generation system is 
driven primarily by a combination of capability needs and an adaptive, evolving 
threat. The resource allocation system is calendar-driven by Congress writing an 
appropriation bill—providing control of funding to Congress and transparency to the 
American public and media for taxpayer money. The defense acquisition 
management system is event-driven by milestones based on commercial industry 
best practices of knowledge points and off-ramps supported by the design, 
development, and testing of the systems as technology matures.   
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